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BY: DAVID T. MCINDOE
I. Introduction
In a Virginia capital penalty trial, the Commonwealth may attempt
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant presents a future
danger to society. 1 The building blocks employed by the prosecutor to
make this showing may include evidence of prior violent crimes for
which the defendant has never been charged, tried or convicted.2 The
Supreme Court of Virginia condones the introduction and use of this
evidence in capital sentencing proceedings. 3 Although the introduction
of this evidence raises several fairness concerns, it is unlikely that the
United States Supreme Court will find that the introduction of
unadjudicated acts offends due process.4 Nevertheless, due process may
require that the sentencer find, by some standard of proof, that the
defendant actually committed the acts alleged before considering that
evidence in support of a further finding of future dangerousness. This
article discusses this requirement and suggests a simple procedural
device for raising and presenting the issue.
II. The Prejudicial Nature of the Introduction of Unadjudicated
Acts
The potential for prejudice is both enormous and almost certain
when the Commonwealth presents evidence of prior violent acts to ajury
which has recently found the defendant guilty of capital murder and is
now responsible for determining the defendant's fate. The prejudice is
often substantive in that the evidence is highly inflammatory and is often
unreliable. The defendant may also suffer procedural prejudice. He is
denied the presumption of innocence as to the acts alleged. In addition,
although defendants in Virginia enjoy a statutory right to notice of what
conduct the Commonwealth will introduce, 5 there is no right to notice of
the form or character of the evidence. Lack of sufficient notice creates
issues of surprise and inability to meaningfully defend against alleged
conduct. Furthermore, the defense is forced to spend more precious
I Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(C). Under this section, a jury must
unanimously determine that the murder for which it convicted the
defendant was vile or that the defendant presents a future danger. To
reach a finding of "future dangerousness," the jury must find that there
exists a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society. The
evidence must establish this probability beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
See also Waye v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 683, 251 S.E.2d 202 (1979).
2 See Chichester v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 311,330, 448 S.E.2d
638, 650 (1994).
3 Stockton v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 192, 209-210, 402 S.E.2d
196,206 (1991); Pruett v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 266,285,351 S.E.2d
1, 12 (1986); Watkins v. Commonwealth. 229 Va. 469,488,331 S.E.2d
422, 436 (1985); LeVasseur v. Commonwealth. 225 Va. 564, 594, 304
S.E.2d 644, 660 (1983).
4 The United States Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the
issue of admission of evidence of unadjudicated acts. While considering
different sentencing issues, the Court has developed what is now ac-
cepted as the "all relevant evidence" standard. See Steven Paul Smith,
Unreliable and Prejudicial: the Use of Extraneous Unadjudicated
Offenses in the Penalty Phases of Capital Trials, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1249
(1993). The "all relevant evidence" standard originates from the Court's
policy that capital defendants deserve personal consideration in sentenc-
resources preparing to defend against acts that extend beyond the
commission of the capital crime.
6
The sentencing trial of Coleman Gray illustrates the prejudice
defendants face by the introduction of evidence of unadjudicated acts.
7
At the guilt phase of Gray's trial, the Commonwealth disclosed that it
would present evidence of unadjudicated acts at the sentencing trial.
Specifically, the prosecutor represented that its evidence consisted of the
testimony of a co-defendant and other inmates that Gray admitted to
murdering Lisa Sorrell and her three year-old daughter. Gray had never
been charged with eithermurder. The nightbefore the sentencing hearing
began, the Commonwealth informed Gray's attorney that it would
present evidence beyond his alleged admissions that connected Gray to
the Sorrell murders. The additional evidence included photographs of the
crime scene and the bodies of the victims and the testimony of the
investigating detective and the medical examiner who performed the
autopsies of the Sorrells' bodies. Although defense counsel protested
that this evidence exceeded the scope permitted under Virginia law, that
he was taken by surprise and that he was unprepared to present a rebuttal,
the trial court permitted the Commonwealth to offer the evidence to the
jury. The jury subsequently sentenced Gray to death based on both the
"future dangerousness" and "vileness" predicates. Gray'sjury was given
no instruction on how they were to consider the evidence of these two
murders.
8
The requirement of a standard of proof discussed in this article is by
no means the only way to combat such highly inflammatory evidence.
Defense counsel should employ every means possible to minimize the
prejudice resulting from the introduction of evidence of unadjudicated
acts. Motions practice is an effective way to combat this prejudice.
Forcing the Commonwealth to disclose and discuss its evidence reduces
the element of surprise and allows the defense to better allocate re-
sources. In addition to this tactical advantage, litigation of issues raised
by defense motions creates a record upon which the defendant may rely
during direct appeal and habeas proceedings. 9
ing. A jury can best weigh aggravating and mitigating factors particular
to a defendant if exposed to all relevant evidence. Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). The Court has held that, in addition
to the standard's application to mitigation evidence, the "all relevant"
standard also applies to introduction of evidence establishing aggravat-
ing factors. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
5 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:2.
6 See, Linda E. Carter, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Standard in
Death Penalty Proceedings: A Neglected Element of Fairness,52 Ohio
St. L.J. 195 (1991); Steven Paul Smith, Unreliable and Prejudicial: the
Use of Extraneous Unadjudicated Offenses in the Penal. Phases of
Capital Trials, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1249 (1993); Fenn, Anything Someone
Else Says Can and Will be UsedAgainst You in a Court of Law: The Use
of Unadjudicated Acts in Capital Sentencing, Capital Defense Digest,
Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 31 (1993).
7 Gray v. Netherland, 116 S.Ct. 2074 (1996) ("Gray I"). See also
case summary of Gray I, Capital Defense Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 4
(1996), and case summary of GraylI, Capital Defense Journal, this issue.
8 Id. at 2078-79.
9 See Spencer, Challenging the FutuieDangerousnessAggravatilg
Factor. Capital Defense Journal, Vol. 8, No. 2, p. 33 (1996). One such
motion is a motion for the disclosure of exculpatory evidence pursuant
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111. Standard of Proof for the Evaluation of Evidence
Current capital sentencing procedure creates a due process concern
that a defendant's sentence may rest wholly or in part upon evidence that
is unreliable. Defendants have a right to due process during sentencing,
although the requirements are less demanding than during the guilt
phase.10 For instance, the standard for the admission of evidence is much
lower. The evidence does not have to meet any requirement beyond being
relevant to the defendant's character. The resulting broad universe of
admissible evidence creates a practical problem. Ajury may find "future
dangerousness," but it is not required to state what evidence it relied
upon. It is possible that it relied solely on evidence that, in addition to
being highly inflammatory, may simply be erroneous. Yet, defendants
and reviewing courts have no means of determining if such improper
consideration occurred and correcting the problem. To make matters
worse, there currently is no procedural mechanism to prevent ajury from
considering erroneous and unreliable evidence, or to guide its consider-
ation of the evidence. Without adequate procedural protections, the
introduction of unadjudicated acts at sentencing creates a risk of an
erroneous sentence that is both unfair and in violation of the defendant's
right to due process.
A standard of proof for the evaluation of evidence of unadjudicated
acts is a step toward ensuring that a capital defendant receives due
process during the penalty-phase. In Addington v. Texas,11 the United
States Supreme Court found that:
The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embod-
ied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding,
is to "instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confi-
dence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of
factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication." The
standard serves to allocate the risk of error between the
litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the
ultimate decision.
12
In capital sentencing, a standard of proof would help provide the
sentencer with confidence that its ultimate finding of "future dangerous-
ness" rests upon events it collectively believes the defendant commit-
ted. 13 Given the finality of a death sentence, a standard is also essential
to sufficiently allocate the risk of an erroneous sentence. In addition, a
standard of proof helps ensure that the guided discretion of the sentencer
will not subject a defendant to the risk of an arbitrarily imposed sentence.
Therefore, trial judges should instruct juries that, in evaluating the
Commonwealth's evidence of unadjudicated acts, they must be certain,
by some standard of proof, that the defendant committed those acts
before relying on that evidence to find "future dangerousness." Senten-
to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S.Ct.
1555 (1995). InGrayv.Netherland, 1 16S.Ct. 2074 (1996), thedefendant
claimed that the prosecution had an obligation underBrady and Kyles to
produce any exculpatory evidence concerning unadjudicated conduct
that it elected to introduce during the penalty trial. The Court did not
dismiss this claim on its merits, but held the defendant defaulted the issue
by not presenting his claim on direct appeal. Id. at 2080-81.
10 See generally Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
11 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
12 Id. at 423 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
13 Carter, supra note 6, at 207.
14477 U.S. 79 (1986).
15 Id. at 84.
16 Stockton v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 192, 210,402 S.E.2d 196,
206 (1991). See also Breard v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68, 86-87,445
cers could employ one of three possible standards of proof in evaluating
evidence of prior criminal behavior: "beyond a reasonable doubt," "by
a preponderance of the evidence," or "by clear and convincing evi-
dence."
At first glance, the current capital sentencing procedure suggests the
standard should be beyond a reasonable doubt. "Future dangerousness,"
like the element of the underlying offense, must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. If unadjudicated acts are the building blocks for a
finding of "future dangerousness," it is logical that a jury should find the
defendant committed the alleged conduct by the same standard.
Unfortunately, both the United States Supreme Court and the
Supreme Court of Virginia have rejected the reasonable doubt standard
for such fact finding at the penalty phase of trial. In McMillan v.
Pennsylvania,14 the United States Supreme Court held that the prosecu-
tion does not need to prove a fact beyond a reasonable doubt even if the
existence of that fact relates to the severity of punishment. 15 The
Supreme Court of Virginia employed similar reasoning in upholding
Virginia's capital sentencing statute in response to a defendant's claim
that the permitted use of unadjudicated acts without a reasonable doubt
standard rendered the statute unconstitutional. 16 Despite the need for a
reasonable doubt standard, the likelihood that Virginia trial courts will
use and instruct juries on the reasonable doubt standard in considering
unadjudicated acts is slim at best, as is the likelihood that failure to
require this instruction is constitutional error.
However, the United States Supreme Court's recent holding in
UnitedStatesv. WattslPutra,17 strongly suggests that, ataminimum, due
process requires a preponderance standard for the consideration of non-
adjudicated acts. In Watts/Putra the Court addressed whether trial courts,
in making sentencing decisions under the federal sentencing guidelines,
could consider conduct for which the defendant had been acquitted. 18
The Court held that ajury's acquittal does not prevent the trial court from
considering the conduct of that acquitted charge, "so long as that
conduct has been proven by a preponderance of the evidence." 19
There is no indication from its opinion that the United States Supreme
Court intended to have an acquittal act as a prerequisite for the require-
ment of a preponderance standard. It is arguable, in fact, that a standard
would not be as essential in cases of acquittal compared to one where no
charge was ever made. In the acquittal cases, there must have been one
or more determinations of probable cause that the defendant committed
the crime.20
While the Court's holding in WattslPutra applies to sentencing
procedure under the federal sentencing guidelines, the holding should
also extend to state sentencing procedures because it is founded in part
on constitutional grounds. In support of its holding, the Court relied upon
its earlier finding in McMillan v. Pennsylvania,21 that the "application of
the preponderance standard at sentencing generally satisfies due pro-
S.E.2d 670, 681 (1994) (upholding the lower court's refusal to instruct
the jury that the Commonwealth must prove the defendant committed
unadjudicated acts beyond a reasonable doubt because the requirement
that thejury find "future dangerousness" by that standard was sufficient).
17 117 S.Ct. 633 (1997).
18 Id. at 634.
19 I1. at 638 (emphasis added).
20 The Court discussed three rationales in reaching its finding. First,
the Court stated that the sentencing guidelines and common law provided
that a sentencing body could consider all relevant evidence. Second, the
prohibition against double jeopardy does not preclude the enhancement
of a sentence for conduct underlying an acquitted charge. Third, the
Court noted that an acquittal was not a finding of fact that the defendant
did not commit the underlying conduct. Id. at 635-38.
21 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
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cess. ' '22 Accordingly, the Court's opinion suggests that a standard of
proof may be required in order to eliminate any due process concerns
created by the admission of evidence of unadjudicated acts.
Remarkably, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has also
held that sentencers should be convinced by preponderance of the
evidence that a defendant committed an act before using that conduct to
impose a sentence. 23 In United States v. Urrego-Linares,24 the Court of
Appeals held that "due process is satisfied by application of a preponder-
ance standard to factual findings made by a court during sentencing."
25
The court found that a standard of proof assures a defendant the
"opportunity to oppose and specifically address the application" of an
aggravating factor which may increase his sentence.26 An application of
the preponderance standard, the court of appeals stated, substantially
increased fairness afforded to a defendant.
27
It is even possible that the more demanding "clear and convincing"
standard of proof will ultimately be required in capital cases. Although
finding it unnecessary to decide in the case before it, the Watts/Putra
Court acknowledged "a divergence of opinion among the circuits as to
whether, in extreme circumstances, relevant conduct thatwould dramati-
cally increase the sentence must be based on clear and convincing
evidence."28 There is hardly more conceivable a dramatic increase in
sentence than from life in prison to death. The United States Supreme
Court has said:
[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sen-
tence of imprisonment, however long. Death, in its finality,
differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison
term differs from one of only a year or two. Because of that
qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in
the need for reliability in the determination that death is the
appropriate punishment in a specific case.
29
Given the immense difference between a life and death sentence, a
requirement that evidence of unadjudicated acts be evaluated by "clear
and convincing" standard of proof is clearly warranted.
IV. A Suggested Jury Instruction
A proposed jury instruction is an effective way to present and
preserve the issue of the need for a standard of proof for evaluating
evidence of unadjudicated acts. A proposed jury instruction is a simple
and inexpensive way to guide the jury's discretion or develop the record.
In addition, Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-263.2 allows a party to make such a
submission if the instruction accurately states the law. The instruction
cannot be rejected, under this statute, simply because it does not conform
with the model jury instructions.
30
22 WattslPut'a, 117 S.Ct. at 637.
23 See, e.g..United States v. Gilliam, 987 F.2d 1009, 1013 (4th Cir.
1993) (holding that government bears the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence the quantity of drugs for which a defen-
dant should be held accountable at sentencing); United States v. Morgan.
942 F.2d 243, 246 (4th Cir 1991) (holding that because the standard of
proof at sentencing is less demanding, the district court may, applying a
preponderance of the evidence standard, consider misconduct that did
not result in conviction); United States v. Sheffer. 896 F.2d 842, 844,
(1990) (stating that during sentencing, the district court's findings of fact
should be based upon a preponderance of the evidence); United States v.
Harris, 882 F.2d 902, 907 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding the appropriate
standard of proof to be applied in a sentencing proceeding under the
guidelines is a preponderance of the evidence standard and if the
government seeks to enhance the sentence, it should bear the burden of
proof and concomitant burdens of production and persuasion).
Relying on the United States Supreme Court's holding in Wattsl
Putra, a jury instruction should suggest that the jury must find, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant committed the alleged
wrongful acts before thejury can rely on those acts fora finding of "future
dangerousness". Such an instruction might read:
You have heard evidence of priorcriminal conduct which
the Commonwealth alleged the defendant committed, but for
which he was never charged, tried orconvicted. Such evidence
may not enter into your consideration of the defendant's
"future dangerousness" unless you determine that it is more
likely than not that the defendant actually engaged in the
alleged conduct. Once you have identified those alleged acts
which the defendant actually committed, you must then deter-
mine whether all the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant is likely to commit serious acts of
violence in the future.
You are not to punish the defendant for the commission
of the alleged conduct; rather, your function is to determine
whether the defendant engaged in such conduct and whether
this conduct suggests "future dangerousness".
If you find from all the evidence and beyond a reasonable
doubt a probability that the defendant will commit criminal
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious
threat to society, he may be sentenced to death. A probability
means a reasonable probability, substantially greater than a
mere likelihood. However, even if you unanimously find that
the defendant, more likely than not, engaged in the conduct
alleged and further find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant presents a future violent threat to society, you may,




In Simmons v. South Carolina,32 the United States Supreme Court
corrected, on dueprocess grounds, a sentencing practice that struck many
as fundamentally unfair. The defendant in Simmons presented and
preserved his issue, the right to inform the jury of his parole ineligibility,
through the proposal of ajury instruction. Similarly, the introduction of
unadjudicated acts in capital sentencing trials and the lack of instruction
on how ajury should evaluate that evidence also raises questions of basic
fairness. Perhaps a suggested jury instruction concerning a standard of
proof for the evaluation of evidence of prior unlawful conduct will
present the United States Supreme Court with another chance to infuse
fairness into capital sentencing procedure.
24 879 F.2d 1234 (4th Cir. 1989).
25 Urrego-Linares, 879 F.2d at 1237.
261d. at 1238.
27 Id.
28 WattslPutra. 117 S.Ct. at 637.
29 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
30 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-263.2.
31 This instruction and one requiring a finding by "clear and
convincing" evidence may, of course, be offered alternately or succes-
sively in order to preserve the record.
32 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (holding that the Due Process Clause
requires that the jury be informed of the defendant's parole ineligibility
when considering "future dangerousness").
